Introduction
Jos sits on the edge of a tableland spread over 5,343 square miles at an average elevation of 4,000 feet above sea. The semi-temperate climate, scenic hilly ranges, and strategic location, in the center of Nigeria, make it a terminus for settlers and a tourist destination. Established by British colonialists in 1915, the city grew around a tin mining industry that attracted labor migrants and merchants from across the country. A century later, Jos remains one of Nigeria's most diverse cities. Its 800,000 inhabitants belong to over fifty ethnolinguistic groups. Though no official statistic is recorded, the population is generally believed to be equal halves Christian and Muslim.
Between the late 1960s and 1990s, as ethnic conflict and religious extremism ravaged neighboring urban centers, including Bauchi, Kaduna, Gombe, and Kano, Jos ranked among Nigeria's most peaceful cities. Over the last fifteen years, however, it gained notoriety as one of the country's most violent. Episodic Christian-Muslim clashes in the metropolis and the outlying settlements claimed over 5,000 lives between 2001 and 2010. 27 Boko Haram bombings and revenge attacks followed, persisting until 2015. Experts have analyzed the structural factors that led to the Jos crises (see Danfulani & Fwatshak 2002; Egwu 2004; Best 2007; Higazi 2007; Ostien 2009 ), highlighting contestations over indigene rights, political representation, and city ownership. Beyond structural causations, Jos scholars have sought to explain the factors shaping the spatial distribution of violence in the different outbreaks (Krause 2011 (Krause , 2017 Bunte & Vinson 2016; Madueke 2014 Madueke , 2015 . This interest follows research trends for other violent cities including Belfast (Cunningham 2013; Mesev et al. 2009 ), Jerusalem (Bhavnani et al. 2014) , Beirut (Bou Akar 2012), and Osh (Kutmanaliev 2015) , while considerable work in this vein has been devoted to Indian cities (see Varshney 2001; Brass 2004; Wilkinson 2006; Berenschot 2011 ).
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The case of Jos has contributed meaningfully to local and global discussions about the intersection between spatiality and collective violence. Krause's (2017) has been more elusive (Sambanis 2001) . Explaining why Jos' poorer neighborhoods are more susceptible to violence than wealthier, Scacco (2012) noted how residents of the former were forced to defend themselves and their families because the government did not provide their areas adequate security.
These studies have advanced our understanding of the spatial dimension of violence in Jos, but there remains much unearthing to do. At a disaggregated level, we still seek to understand how neighborhoods, once locales of peaceful coexistence and congeniality, turned into arenas of atrocities. We also need a systematic examination of how different types of neighborhood settings shaped patterns of violence and how the violence reshaped them.
Taking up these tasks, this article selects the neighborhoods of Angwan Rogo and Nasarawa Gwong for its case study. The analysis offers three major contributions to the field. First, by examining what Jos neighborhoods underwent, the study highlights transformational milestones that can be applied to understanding conflict in other cities struggling with similar security challenges.
This insight is crucial for formulating and implementing violence prevention and peace-building. Second, in conceptualizing ethnic strongholds and frontiers, the article provides tools to make sense of the interaction between violence and its spatial context. Profiling the two distinct settings and how they differentially contribute to violent outcomes produces practical tips for how authorities can respond to conflict with greater context sensitivity. Although politicization of ethnic identities in Nigeria has its origin in colonial rule, post-colonial events expedited the process. One definitive turning point was the 1986 implementation of IMF and World Bank structural adjustment program (SAP) following a recession triggered by fall in oil revenue. Intended to restructure consumption and production and to reduce dependence on crude oil and consumer goods imports, the SAP turned out to be counterproductive, plunging Nigeria into a major economic crisis (Anyanwu 1992:5) . High unemployment followed due to cuts in government expenditure. Scholars have stressed the SAP's negative effects not only on the economy, but also on group relations (Ihonvbere & Ekekwe 1988; Beckman 1991; Adetula 1992; Osaghae 1995; Nnoli 1998; Mustapha 2000; Egwu 2004 ). The overlap of SAPs and conflict proliferation elsewhere in Africa is well documented (Williams 2004; Sesay & Ukeje 2009 ). In the wake of the SAPprecipitated austerity, Nigerians became discontent and the military government's last flicker of legitimacy was extinguished (Jega 2000:36) .
To relieve their plight, Nigerians looked beyond the state. A foremost source of succor was tribal and kinship ties (Egwu 1998 (Egwu , 2004 . Growing ethnic consciousness coincided with rising ethnic associations (Osaghae 1995; Jega 2000; Egwu 2004) . "Not only was there an upsurge in the membership of these associations," stated Osaghae (1995:46) , but also "there was a rapid expansion in their number, variety and purpose." The government was generally hostile to signs of dissent; trying to curry favor with citizens, it therefore deployed a system of patronage, seeking influential religious and tribal associations to redeem its legitimacy (Jega 2000:20) . In 1987, during an "ethnicization of politics" or a "politicization of ethnicity" (Egwu 2004:32) , the Jasawa Development Association (JDA) was born. Representing the Hausa population in Jos, this organization was a protagonist in the indigene-settler conflict that would ensue.
Meanwhile, several developments hastened transformation of Jos' already politicizing residential areas into militarized ethnic strongholds and frontiers. The first was creation of Jos North LGA. Nigeria has 774 administrative units known as
LGAs LGA.
Other events helped spur deterioration of relations. One was a return to democracy after military rule-1999's electoral campaigns were particularly acrimonious. More consequential, though, was the newly elected chairman's embargo on indigene certificates for the Hausa community (Ostien 2009 
Research Methods and Data
This study is based on fieldwork conducted in Jos between 2015 and 2017.
Because, as Brass (2004:4839) stated, "quantitative, statistical analyses cannot demonstrate the existence of a dynamic process," I pursued an ethnographic approach that could capture processes at a disaggregated level. Data sources include interviews, primary school common entrance registers, and election results, alongside informal discussions I held in neighborhoods, motor parks, and other public places. This ethnography marks the first time primary school registers were used to systematically approximate Jos neighborhoods' ethnic composition and how it changed during the study period.
Interviews and Discussions
The article draws from forty-seven interviews. clashes, or sporadic isolated incidents). After organizing interview responses into coherent themes based on the negative or positive effect an event had on group relations, I ordered them chronologically and re-contextualized them into a coherent story. The interviews were analyzed in a manner that directly addresses this article's central concern: to empirically demonstrate the changes neighborhoods underwent in the lead-up to large-scale violence. The approach seeks to reveal each event's effect on intragroup and intergroup dynamics.
Moreover, it aims to understand how group relations degenerated to the point that residents who co-existed peacefully for many years rationalized picking up arms and attacking each other.
Primary School Common Entrance Registers
Because the Nigerian census does not include ethnic categories, I used public primary school composition as a proxy for the ethnic composition of the neighborhood in which the school is located. I took the graduating class as a representative sample of the school since these pupils all sit for the common entrance examination. I analyzed registers for the classes of 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005 , seeking any remarkable patterns in the buildup to the 2001 violence and afterwards. I began by categorizing the pupils as "Muslim" or "Christian;" in Jos and much of Nigeria, names are usually an accurate reflection of individuals' religions.
Election Results
The 2015 general elections provided a general idea of variations in voting patterns in ethnic strongholds and frontiers. I used the 2015 presidential election since records for elections in 1999 and 2008 were either inaccessible or unavailable;
LGA elections, moreover, were not held in Jos North after 1999 and until 2008.
The datasets had inevitable biases and limitations. An ethnic group might have been overrepresented or underrepresented in a school or a class by chance or for various other reasons. In interviews, respondents might have twisted events to suit their own narratives and memories of some occurrences, from several decades back, might have been fuzzy. And, as mentioned, most elections results proved inaccessible. To address these concerns, I conducted a robust "ground truthing" process that involved visits to the neighborhoods, close observation, and discussions with a cross-section of residents. Additionally, I assessed the veracity of seemingly outrageous claims by triangulating different sources of data.
The Evolution of an Ethnic Stronghold
To explain an ordinary residential area's transformation into an ethnic stronghold, I begin with a description of this type of socio-spatial setting. At its basic level, a stronghold is a segregated settlement where one ethnic group predominates and controls the prevailing way of life. A Muslim stronghold, for example, has a visible presence of mosques, Koranic schools, and other Islamic institutions, while Christian institutions are few or nonexistent. The ethnic stronghold may be surrounded by areas of similar ethnic composition, though at least part of its boundary is shared with an ethnically mixed area, which, in turn, shares a boundary with a stronghold that rivals the ethnic stronghold. The ethnic segregation in the stronghold masks other peculiarities, such as high level of ethnic solidarity that becomes manifested in collective behavior such as voting for the same political party or candidate (Olzak 1983:357) .
The stronghold helps conceptualize how identities are constructed and reconstructed (Nagel 1994 ) within a spatialized emergent subculture. Olzak (1983:356) explains the type of solidarity in the stronghold as "the conscious identification with a given ethnic population" that "includes the maintenance of strong ethnic interaction networks and institutions that socialize new members and reinforce social ties." Mobilizing co-ethnics for collective violence is more feasible in a stronghold setting (Fearon 2006) , which breeds opportunity for cost-free intragroup communication (Weidmann 2009). Mobilizing residents into mobs is easier in the safety of segregated areas where "contentious claim making gains protection from routine surveillance and repression because of terrain, built environment" (Tilly 2000:144) .
But segregation and solidarity are not the only elements. A stronghold is characterized by the presence of politicized and militarized social networks comprising local politicians, self-proclaimed ethnic activists, gangs, thugs, and ordinary residents. These actors play complementary roles, crucial for accomplishing collective goals, though they are also driven as individuals with personal objectives, such as securing money, jobs, and favors. Within the networks are social subsystems analogous to riots systems (Brass 2004) table 3 .1), with over 100 mosques and Koranic schools (a figure counting the many garages and verandas used for praying and teaching); the only two churches that once stood were both destroyed in the violence. The arsonists were part of the violent network that helps the neighborhood selfmaintain as a stronghold. and cultural and linguistic affinity. 34 Another event that affected the demography of Angwan Rogo was the low-level violence in parts of Jos in 1994. Four Muslim individuals were killed in these riots. The fact that all four killed were Muslims was a source of major grievance. 35 Of the 104 people arrested in connection to the violence, twenty-one were Christian and eighty-three were Muslim. The disparity in number of arrests was also a source of frustration for many Muslims. 36 Although the 1994 violence was low-level and Angwan Rogo remained nonviolent, it marked a crucial formative stage in the neighborhood's militarization.
It was the first time that some residents organized themselves into aggressive mobs on the basis of ethnic identity within Angwan Rogo. Brass (2004) It was simply because of God's grace that there was no fighting in the area. The young people were moving around in groups angrily as if ready to attack. Fortunately, some older residents called some of the young men and cautioned them against engaging in violence... violence did not happen, but I can tell you some of us knew that it was only a matter of time. You can say that was the time that an army for future fighting really started building up. By the grace of Allah, Jos North cannot be rigged. Come to think of it, was there an election somewhere that was won and not announced? When it became apparent that we had won and they had to announce, did they not cancel the elections? For your information, this upcoming election cannot be cancelled and by force we shall win, Allah willing. Look, we are Muslims, over eighty percent of the people of Jos North are Muslims. We are not Christians. Do you think we shall vote a Christian to lead us in Jos North? 43 Expressing solidarity with their co-ethnics around the city, Angwan Rogo residents did not leave onlookers to doubt which political party they supported. Several neighborhood-level party offices were located there, and they, along with many other buildings, were painted in ANPP official colors and flaunted the party logo.
Almost four years after the ANPP merged with two other parties to form the APC, its green, white, and blue still showed on some walls in Angwan Rogo. 
The Making of the Frontier
When popularized by Kotek (1999:228) , the notion of the frontier was identified as something foremost located "on fault-lines between ethnic, religious or ideological wholes." Second, it is a disputed area characterized by contestations and struggles for political control between rival groups. Third, it symbolizes greater conflicts, being "emblematic of larger disputed areas or zones" (Kotek 1999:231 At a point everyone knew we had to part ways. Muslims had their agenda and Christians had theirs. There was no way we could work together because there was no trust. The Muslims were celebrating the creation of the new LGA and Christians were very sad about the development. We just parted ways. Christian residents started having their meetings and Muslims also started having their meetings. But it was different before then, we used to have our meetings together… but that was before the creation of Jos North. 49 Besides going separate ways, social networks started aligning with their co-ethnics in the adjoining segregated settlements.
It was a situation where the Muslim in Nasarawa Gwong was closer to his Muslim brothers in Yan Shanu, Dilimi and Gangare than his Christian neighbors. The Christian in Nasarawa Gwong abandoned his Muslim neighbors and associated more with his Christian brothers in Angwan Rukuba and Tina Junction. Even the associations did the same thing. So you find vigilantes from here working with their brothers in the nearby settlements; no one wants to work with their neighbor who is of a different religion. The older and more established members of the party know that they need the youth to succeed. That is why they approached us as a group to enlist our support. But before working with them we gave them conditions. For example, we told them that we wanted employment, school admissions, and small loans to start businesses. These are some of the things that the youth needs and that is why we joined ANPP, because we saw that the party members were the kind of people that would provide us with these things. 53 Indigene youth networks in Nasarawa Gwong also had major roles in organizing campaign activities for the PDP. One local politician said it was at the height of the 1999 elections that he and many Christian peers joined the youth wing.
PDP was new then and they were looking for members. It was one elder in this area who approached me. I immediately agreed to join because he was a man I respected. I told some of my friends about it and they also joined. That was how we joined the campaigns. We started in this neighborhood, traveled to other towns, and still brought back the campaigns to this neighborhood because ANPP was also strong here, very strong.
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Transboundary alliances existed between ethno-political networks in Nasarawa Gwong and its adjoining areas. PDP loyalists in Nasarawa Gwong organized joint campaigns with their counterparts from the adjacent Christian stronghold of Angwan Rukuba. ANPP supporters in Nasarawa Gwong collaborated with their coloyalists in the Muslim strongholds of Yan Shanu, Dilimi, and faraway Gangare.
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This cross-border politicking led to skirmishes best described as turf wars between youth wings of the rivalling political parties at different stages of the campaigns. posters, and handbills were the vehicles to swap threats. In different neighborhoods, countless posters were slapped on walls or dropped in public places, bearing messages of hate and group's claims to be the more powerful. 58 Nasarawa Gwong was a hotspot for the printed matter, with several residents recounting how posters and handbills were flying about in the weeks before violence erupted. 59 One resident said about five posters were put up on the wall of his house. 60 After an interlude of uneasy calm-during which inflammatory exchanges still continued-the storm hit. Ethnic violence erupted in Jos on September 7, 2001.
The triggering incident is well documented in academic and official reports (see Insecurity and fear are known to precipitate segregation (Rodgers 2004:113) .
Members of both groups, especially those living in more ethnically diverse areas, showed some unwillingness to leave. Even some who fled these areas later returned. As a result, some parts of the city remained ethnically mixed and were the main battlegrounds for violence in 2008 and 2010. To start with, in ordering neighborhoods into ethnic strongholds and frontiers and tracing the processes that underpin their emergence and development, the article elucidated a useful conceptual framework for coherently investigating, understanding, and explaining variations in the spread and patterns of violence in a divided city. Rather than conceiving of violence as completely chaotic, haphazard, and decontextualized from its socio-spatial context, the concepts uncovered how patterns of violence recursively interrelate with the demographic and physical environment in which they occur. Thus, as demonstrated, ethnic strongholds and frontiers are both a consequent and a predicator of particular violent forms.
Conclusion
Moreover, the cross-sectional approach of most studies on spatial patterns of violence offers a snapshot, failing to capture the dynamic socio-spatial conditions that support and shape violence. The processional approach adopted in this article focused on the spatial as well as the temporal dimension of how neighborhoods transformed. Doing this brings into sharp relief how ethnic composition, social networks, and location of the neighborhood all interact in space and over time. In unearthing how Angwan Rogo became progressively more segregated, I also uncovered how its social networks became increasingly intraethnic. Accordingly, as group relations deteriorated in Nasarawa Gwong, residents' associations and vigilantes became decentralized and parallel networks emerged along ethnic lines.
Tracing these processes of transformation revealed how a neighborhood's ethnic composition and location can affect its evolution. Nasarawa Gwong's ethnic composition and its location between segregated settlements contributed to transforming into a frontier. This insight has important implications for policy. It calls for peace-builders to examine a neighborhood's location vis-à-vis adjoining neighborhoods and to respond in ways that consider group solidarity in the stronghold, multilevel competition and contestations in the frontier, and their developments over time.
Additionally, exploring the very events and processes that helped transform the neighborhoods has revealed possible inroads for managing conflict and mitigating violence. This exploration shines a light on milestones that mark strategic points for intervention. For example, it is clear that periods preceding elections are characterized by hikes in ethnic activism and at these critical times violence is most likely to erupt. It is also clear that political appointments negatively impact social networks. This understanding can help authorities design contextsensitive proactive strategies for preventing violence. Such measures could include civic structures to monitor and check use of divisive rhetoric by politicians within neighborhoods during electoral campaigns.
This article is a first step in exploring the spatial patterns of violence in a riot-ridden city. To further understand the concentration and persistence of violence in particular socio-spatial contexts, we need to zoom in on frontiers. Understanding in detail the causal mechanisms that make frontiers sites of persistent violence will, besides advancing knowledge on the dynamics of ethnic violence, contribute meaningfully to finding effective response to violent riots.
